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GOLD CONTRACTS AND CURRENCY REGULATION
CHARLES

S.

COLLIER

Is the historic "gold clause" controversy. still alive?' Can we find in the
leading opinions of the Supreme Court a firm foundation for constructive
currency policies within the true limits of the constitutional grants of
power to the federal government which relate to this subject? Is there
perhaps a hitherto undiscovered, but intrinsically acceptable "middle ground"
as between the conflicting views that have been maintained on the question
of the constitutionality of the gold -clause legislation of June 5, 1933,2
so that the hope may be entertained that eventually a consensus of legal
and political opinion on this subject can be established?
-The central questions with relation to the gold clause controversy have
been brought into focus once more by two arresting decisions of the United
States Supreme Court rendered in the course of the year 1937. The first
of these is the decision in the case of Holyoke Water Power Company v.
American Paper Company, Inc.,3 announced March 1, 1937. In this case
the Supreme Court had to deal with the application and effect of a clause
in water power leases entered into between 1881 and 1897, which stipulated that the lessee should yield and pay to the lessor as rent "a quantity
of gold which shall be equal in amount to $1,500 of the gold coin of the
United States, of the standard of weight and fineness of the year 1894, or
the equivalent of this commodity in the United States currency." 4 The
Supreme Court, in harmony with both lower courts, held that the obligation of the lease was dischargeable by payment in any lawful form of
United States currency, dollar for dollar, and that the lessor was not
entitled to any damages or extra allowance on this claim because of the
alleged excess market value of the gold deliveries stipulated for when estimated in terms of the legal tender currency actually in circulation at the
time of the legal determination of the amount due.5 Four Justices dissented without rendering a separate opinion.
"On the general subject, see Nebolsine, The Gold Clause in Private Contracts (1933)
42 YALE L. J. 1051; Post and Willard, The Power of Congress to Nullify Gold Clauses
(1933) 46 HARv. L. Rav. 1223; Collier, Gold Contracts and Legislative Power (1934)
2 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 303; Nussbaum, Comparative and International Aspects of
American Gold Clause Abrogation (1934) 44 Y.X L. J. 53; Dawson, The Gold Clause
Decisions (1935) 33 MIcHr. L. REv. 647; Dickinson, The Gold Decisions (1935) -83
U. OF PA. L. REv. 715; Hart, The Gold Clause in United States Bonds (1935) 48
HARV. L. Rv. 1057; Pennock, The Private Bond Case (1935) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV.
194; Nussbaum, Multiple Currency and Index Clauses (1936) U. OF PA. L. REv. 569.
248 STAT. 112 (1934), 31 U. S. C. A. § 463 (Supp. 1937).
'300 U. S. 324, 57 Sup. Ct. 485, 81 L. ed. 678 (1937).
'300 U. S. 324,57 Sup. Ct. 485, 487; 81 L. ed. 678, 680 (1937).
'The specific controversy arose in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding, but there
is nothing in any of the opinions rendered that would indicate that any special principle
as to equitable apportionment of assets among the creditors of a bankrupt exerted any
influence on the decision in the instant case.
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The second important decision rendered by the Supreme Court during
the year 1937, which argumentatively at least involves the "gold clause"
resolution of June 5, 1933, was that in the group of cases reported under
the name of Smyth v. United States,6 decided on December 13, 1937. These
cases concerned claims for interest on certain bonds of the United States
which had been "called" for redemption by the publication of official notices.
The bonds in question were all gold clause bonds of the first and fourth
Liberty Loan series. The "call" was issued on March 14, 1935, and stated
that interest on all outstanding bonds subject to the "call" would cease
on the redemption date-June 15, 1935. The petitioners in the cases under
consideration in each instance abstained from presenting their bonds for
redemption, and some months later demanded payment of the interest
coupons, on the theory that the "call" for redemption was invalid, and
that the bonds were still in force.
The majority of the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cardozo, held that the actions to recover interest could not be maintained
because the notice of redemption published by the Secretary of the Treasury
was valid under the terms of the bonds, and had not been complied with.
The reasoning of the majority opinion proceeds along somewhat technical
lines. The cases are disposed of on the ground that the "call" did not
commit the government either expressly or by indirection to a forbidden
medium of payment, and that there had not been any anticipatory breach of
the contract.
The majority opinion does not rely upon the gold clause legislation of
1933, and does not really approach the question as to the ultimate constitutional power of Congress in the premises. In this connection, the majority opinion states:
"No question of constitutional law is involved in the decision of
these cases. No question is here as to the correctness of the decision
in Perry v. United States or as to the meaning or effect of the opinion
there announced. All such inquiries are put aside as unnecessary to
the solution of the problem now before us. Irrespective of the validity
or invalidity of the whole or any part of the legislation of recent years
devaluing the dollar, the maturity of the bonds in suit was accelerated
a consequence of such acceleration, the right to inby valid notice. ' As
7
terest has gone.
A separate opinion was rendered by Mr. Justice Stone, in which he
concurred in the result in these cases, but placed his concurrence on the
ground that the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933 in effect abrogated the
supposed obligation of the Government of the United States to pay in
gold coin in accordance with the literal tenor of the recitals in the bonds.8
058 Sup. Ct. 248, 82 L. ed. 235 (1937).

"58 Sup. Ct. 248, 255; 82 L. ed. 235 (1937).
'58 Sup. Ct. 248, 257; 82 L. ed. 235, 242 (1937).
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There was an able dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice McReynolds, in which
Mr. Justice Sutherland and Mr. Justice Butler concurred. The minority
group maintained that the petitioners should recover because the "call' of
March 14, 1935 was not effective, and the bonds were still in force. The
premise of the reasoning of the minority Justices was that the gold clause
resolution of 1933 was unconstitutional in a basic sense, as regards the
application thereof to the obligations of the United States.9 For this
premise, they were able to quote the authority of the majority of the court,
as manifested in the theory of the decision in Perry-v. United States.'0
The dissenting Justices have never been able to acquiesce in the position
taken by the majority of the court in the gold clause controversy. The
persistence of this dissent is a challenge to those who wish to see the currency powers of the United States placed upon clear and indisputable
grounds. Even from a purely practical point of view, the fact that four
Justices of the United States Supreme Court have repeatedly dissented in
these gold clause cases creates a risk that the policy of Congress in this
field may yet be crippled or misapplied.
It seems appropriate, therefore, at this time with the more detached
viewpoint that the passage of the years has made possible, to re-examine the
central questions at issue in the leading Supreme Court cases on the gold
clause controversy, especially Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Company,"1 NortZ v. United States,'2 and Perry v. United States,3 which contain the fullest exposition of the views of both branches of the Supreme
Court on this important subject.
Perhaps the major criticism of the opinions rendered in the various
stages of the gold clause controversy is that which points to the failure to
find a middle ground whereby the power of Congress to control the currency
could be satisfactorily reconciled with the general maintenance of private
contractual rights.
It is true that the opinion of the majority effects a certain compromise
by allowing to the obligations of the United States a theoretical inviolability,
so that as a matter of substantive law, the gold clauses in the United States
bonds are not to be impaired, while at the same time, it is held that the
gold clauses in private obligations may be denied enforceability, and .certainly are not wholly untouchable as a matter of substantive principle. But
these rulings do not represent a genuine reconciliation of private interests
and governmental power. They indicate merely that the Court has awarded
'58 Sup. Ct. 248, 259; 82 L. ed. 235, 244 (1937).
."294 U. S. 330, 55 Sup. Ct. 432, 79 L. ed. 912 (1935).
"294 U. S. 240, 55 Sup. Ct. 407, 79 L. ed. 883 (1935).
'294 U. S.317, 55 Sup. Ct. 428, 79 L. ed. 907 (1935).
'Supra note 10.

GOLD CONTRACTS AND CURRENCY REGULATION

523

a complete victory to governmental power in the field of private obligations, since these are held subject to the retroactive application of the legislation denying validity to gold clauses in contracts, while at the same time
a partial, though perhaps illusory victory is awarded to the private interests
of the bondholders in the important field of the government's own obligations, since it is held as a matter of substantive principle that these gold
clause obligations are inviolable.
In other words, the Court does not reconcile the opposing interests in
any genuine synthesis of legal reasoning, but compromises the issues somewhat by awarding distinctive success in different parts of the field of dispute
to each of the two great opposing interests. The reconciliation is a mechanical adjustment or balance, and not an organic union or vital fusion of the
opposing interests.
Similarly, in the dissenting opinions no effort is made to show what
concessions could permissibly have been made to governmental power in
this field, while yet the substance and essence of private rights were adequately safeguarded. Mr. Justice McReynolds lays it down in his dissenting
opinion in the Perry case that the legislation in question is not a legitimate
regulation of the currency, but is actually designed to destroy contracts, as
if that were a legitimate end in itself.' 4 This conclusion seems to suggest
that gold clause obligations are constitutionally untouchable, and his position is an extreme one in favor of the supremacy of contracts, even private
contracts, over governmental processes, however important to the welfare
of the people.
Yet the existence of a middle ground, whereby the most essential intere~ts of both the government and the creditor class might have been made
secure, is clearly enough indicated, and this is true from two distinct points
of view.
In the first place, there is certainly a controlling limitation applicable to
the power of Congress to pass legislation under the guise of the currency
power which is not in substance and effect currency legislation. Obviously,
the power of Congress to regulate the value of money could not be used
to support and render constitutional any kind of statute which Congress
might choose to enact. A federal statute which purported to cancel all
contracts for payments above $1,000, on the argumentative ground that
they interfered with the monetary system of the nation, could justly be
characterized as lacking any genuine relation to the currency problems
of the country, and hence as not being in reality a statute passed under the
currency powers of Congress. Whatever might be the -title and declared
purpose of such an act and its incidental phraseology, if the real purpose
1294

U. S. 330, 361; 55 Sup. Ct. 448, 79 L. ed. 912, 927 (1935).
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and substantial effect were not to deal with currency matters, but to deal
with something else not committed to the federal government, it cannot be
doubted that it would be both the right and the duty of the courts to do
what they could to nullify its operation.
Now, from this point of view, the very crux of the problem in the gold
clause cases is to determine whether or not the legislation in question was
in reality currency legislation designed to effect necessary or desirable adjustments in the monetary affairs of the nation, or whether under the guise
of verbal references to the currency situation the statute was really aimed
primarily and substantially to accomplish something other than a genuine
currency purpose. The question of the true classification of the statute,
and the problem as to whether it properly falls within the legal category'
of currency legislation, is not adequately discussed by either the majority
or the minority of the Court, although it is evident that the two groups
of Justices take different views on this controlling question. Thus, Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes says:
"We are concerned with the constitutional power of the Congress
over the monetary system of the country and its attempted frustration.
Exercising that power, the Congress has undertaken to establish a
uniform currency and parity between kinds of currency, and to make
that currency, dollar for dollar, legal tender for the payment of debts.
In the light of abundant experience, the Congress was entitled to choose
such a uniform monetary system, and to reject a dual system with
respect to all obligations
within the range of the exercise of its con5
stitutional authority."'
It is clear that the Chief Justice bases his reasoning on the assumption
that the legislation in question is genuine currency legislation. If the character of the legislation were such that its relation to actual currency needs
did not appear to be the dominant consideration, or even an important and
weighty consideration, it would be entirely consistent with all the arguments
and language of his opinions to hold that such legislative "extravagance"
as that supposed would not be sustainable under the currency powers of
Congress.
The existence of the middle ground between governmental power and
private right is thus indicated. The governmental power is controlling .as
long as the legislation is genuine currency legislation, with a dominant, or
at least very weighty and influential element of currency policy behind it,
and with stabilizing or otherwise beneficial effects upon the currency as
one of its most substantial and immediate effects. But there is no reason
why this line of thought should be carried so far as to say that any slight
relevance of the legislation to currency matters could sustain a law whose
15294 U. S. 240, at 316 (1935).
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primary and direct effect seemed to be the ruin of the creditor class and
the repudiation of obligations.
Dealing with this same central issue, Mr. Justice McReynolds, voicing the
opposite opinion, says:
"The fundamental problem now presented is whether recent statutes
passed by Congress in respect of money and credits were designed to
attain a legitimate end, or whether, under the guise of pursuing a
monetary policy, Congress really has inaugurated a plan primarily designed to destroy private obligations, repudiate national debts, and
drive into the Treasury all gold within the country ....
Considering all
the circumstances, we must conclude they show that the plan disclosed
* is of the latter description."' 16
He gives no argument or proof to explain the mental process by which he
arrives at the conclusion that the legislation in question is not currency
legislation, but he evidently has in mind in the above passage what may
be described as a middle ground, and it is similar to the middle ground
whose existence is implicit in the reasoning of the Chief justice. Yet
Mr. Justice McReynolds continues a few paragraphs later in the course of
his opinion:
"This Court has not heretofore ruled that Congress may require the
holder of an obligation to accept payment in subsequently devalued
coins, or permission by the government to pay in such coins. The legislation before us attempts this very thing. If this is permissible, then
a gold dollar containing one grain of gold may become the standard,
all contract rights fall, and huge profits appear on the Treasury books.
...We must not forget that if this power exists, Congress may readily
destroy other obligations which present obstruction to the desired effect
of further depletion. The destruction of all obligations by reducing the
standard gold dollar to one grain of gold, or brass, or nickel, or copper,
or lead, will become an easy possibility. We think that in the circumstances Congress had no power to destroy the obligations of the gold
clauses in private obligations. The attempt to do this was planned
usurpation, arbitrary and oppressive."
In these latter sentences, Mr. justice McReynolds seems to lose sight
of the fact that under his own assumptions, and under the assumptions of
the majority also, the changes in question must be genuine currency regulations in order to be valid. Is it not clear that an attempt of Congress to
provide a monetary standard of the value of one grain of copper or lead as
a gold dollar would not at the present time be a legitimate currency measure?
It would obviously not be intended to improve the currency situation as its
controlling purpose, but would be aimed to alter radically the economic
significance of debtor-creditor relations as its primary and'dominant objective. Such a step would wholly destroy confidence in the circulating
11294 U. S. 330, at 372, 375 (1935).
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medium and produce disastrous inflation of prices, whereby the monetary.
values of commodities would be carried to unprecedented heights. A step
that would destroy the functional efficiency of the circulating medium could
hardly be regarded as designed for genuine currency purposes. Not merely
the literal purport of the words of the statute, but also its evident and
controlling purposes and it dominant or more characteristic effects would
have to be regarded in determining its classification, as falling within or
without the category of currency legislation.' 7
No such evil consequences have followed from the actual legislation now
under discussion. Essential confidence in the government's money has not
disappeared, nor has there been any real inflation of prices, though during
several short periods since June, 1933, when other inflationary factors have
been at work, there have been important advances in prices. Even yet, price
increases that have occurred have been too slight to bring about anything
more than a partial restoration of the average price levels maintained through
a long series of previous years.' 8
The truth is, of course, that Mr. Justice McReynolds thinks that the line
between legitimate currency measures and measures of arbitrary power,
masquerading under the guise, of currency legislation, has already been
transgressed by Congress, but he does not give any definitiof or test that
would enable us to see when legislation that has the formal character and
announced purpose of currency legislation ceases to be such. His apparent
assumption-that any legislation that has a limiting effect of any sort on
existing contractual obligations is illegitimate as currency legislation'O-cannot possibly be accepted. Many currency laws, universally admitted to be
valid, have had precisely that effect, and have involved this principle as
truly as the "gold clause" legislation did. 20 When Mr. Justice McReynolds
says, "The gold clause in no substantial way interfered with the power of
coining money or regulating its value or providing a uniform currency," 2 '
he is simply refusing to examine the facts, or to take cognizance of the
mass of material presented in the briefs and arguments of counsel, which
established beyond a doubt that the gold clauses did have some substantial
effect on the currency situation.
'Cf. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 19 L. ed. 482 (1869); United States v.
Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 80 L. ed. 477 (1936) ; Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Company, 259 U. S.20 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L. ed. 817 (1922).
'BRATT, BusINEss CYCLES AND FOREcASTING (Business Publications Inc., Chicago,
1937), Chap. X passim; Hanna, Currency Control and Private Property (1933) 33 COL.
L. REv. 617.
-294 U. S. 330, at 362, 364, 375,- 376 (1935).
'Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 20 L. ed. 287 (1871) ; Juilliard v. Greenman, 110
U. S.421, 4 Sup. Ct. 122, 28 L. ed. 204 (1884) ; Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 13.
S. 302 (1910); 4 STAT. 699 (Act of June 28, 1834, establishing a new regulation of
the weight and value of gold coin, whereby six per cent was taken from the weight of
each dollar).
=294 U. S.330, at 376 (1935).
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The real significance of the gold clause decisions of the Supreme Court,
in a long historical perspective, would be to show that the legislation in
question, in the opinion of the majority of the Court, did not go beyond
the proper field of currency legislation. But the problem before the critics
and commentators is to ascertain more accurately the true scope and reach
of the currency power of Congress in the light of these decisions. Because
the present legislation has been held to be within the true currency power
of Congress, it does not follow that that power has no limits, or that
judicial protection is no longer effectual to restrain the usurpation of legislative power aimed at results directly destructive of property and contractual
rights.2 2 Such results canniot be comprised within the classification of
legally incidental effects upon private rights, flowing from the authorized
23
exercise of governmental power.
Naturally, the analysis of the whole problem presented in the gold clause
cases depends upon formulating with some definiteness of outline the essential concepts or principles which are to govern the discussion. Before we can
decide whether the Constitution has been violated, we must agree as to
what is the meaning of the expression "the value of money", what is
"regulation", what is "property". We must distinguish between the economic substance of contracts and the literal form of contract claims. We
must ask ourselves whether persons have been deprived of property in a
constitutional sense, when they have sustained no damage in a practical
business sense. We must inquire whether the concept of "property" may
permissibly be defined independently of the social exigencies and economic
changes under which a given problem as to the description and definition
of property rights arises.
If these tasks of definition of fundamental concepts and dominant legal
factors are honestly accepted, we shall have the basis for determining
whether or not the legislation lately under litigation satisfies the constitu-.
tional criteria. But unless this task of definition is grappled with, there
is hopeless uncertainty or confusion of thought as to what are the limits, if
any, of congressional power in this field, and the jurist, seems to be confronted with the unpleasant alternative of yielding everything to the governmental power, reserving no vestige of property or contract right under
the shadow of effective constitutional guarantees, or in the alternative, erecting
such a rigid barrier against governmental political action as would cripple
to a disastrous extent the discretionary powers of the government.
"Cf. Taft, C. J., dissenting in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, at 564,
565, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923).
'Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 31 Sup. Ct. 265 (1911);
Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 20 Sup. Ct. 96 (1899) ;
New York v. United States, 257 U. S. 257, 42 Sup. Ct. 239, 66 L. ed. 385 (1922).
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What does the power expressly granted to Congress "to regulate the
value" of money comprise ?24 "Value" in ordinary parlance means value
in exchange. The exchange value of money is its gereral purchasing
power..2 5 No other clear conception of "value", as used in the language of
the Constitution, can be formed. If the term "value" referred merely to
metallic content, or the intrinsic worth of coin, the phrase "to regulate the
value of money" would be equivalent to the phrase "to coin money", for
if money is to be coined, the exertion of this power implies the fixation of
the quantity of the various metals to be included in a given unit of the
coined currency and the denomination or choice of the nominal accounting
value to be attributed to such coin.2 6 The phrase "to regulate the value
thereof" obviously means something more. It can only mean to regulate
the purchasing power of money; that is, its exchange value in terms of other
commodities.
If Congress thus has the right to regulate the purchasing power of
money, it seems clear that one reasonable form in which this power might
be exerted would be in the direction of price stabilization. One of the most
serious and pervasive aspects of the present or "recent," depression has
been the collapse of commodity prices, followed by the decline in the valuations of all sorts of financial securities. To give to the coined money of
the United States and its substitutes a continuously stable and reliable purchasing power in terms of commodities would certainly seem to be one
of the reasonable objectives for the exercise of the formal monetary powers
of Congtess. If the power to regulate the value of money were carried into
other fields, so that the objective was not stabilization of prices, but the
continuous diminution thereof, an entirely different constitutional question
would be presented. It might appear that in such a case the formal power
to regulate the purchasing power of money was being used to destroy rights
of contract and property as if that were a legitimate objective in itself, and
the situation would at least come within the scope of Mr. Justice McReynolds' somewhat inarticulate major premise.2 7 But the present legislation, which is aimed at reflation, and which has, in the result, only
accomplished a moderate restoration of the price levels normal throughout
a long average of years prior to the present depression, can certainly not
be regarded as beyond the reasonable sphere of the exercise of the currency
powers.
Price levels'are capable of statistical formulation. To apply the test of
Section 8,

'eUNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Article I,
clause 5.
IFAIRCHILD, FURNISS AND BUCK, ELEMENTARY ECONOMICS (Rev.

ed. 1930) pp. 508,
509; ELY, OUTLINE OF ECONOMICS (third revised edition 1920) pp. 155 ff.

'Cf. Collier, Gold Contracts and Legislative Power (1934) 2 Gzo.
at 324 ff.
'294 U. S.330, at P. 369 (1935).

WASH.

L.

REv.

303,
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approximate reflation of prices as a criterion for the proper exercise of
currency powers, and for the fixation of a legitimate objective for currency
legislation, is therefore to apply a reasonably definite test which keeps us
wholly inside the marginal limitations of the power of Congress and satisfies such standards of reasonableness as have been relied upon by the
Congress and by the courts in the past in relation to other legislative
situations, dissimilar indeed in many respects, but still offering sufficient
analogy to the present problem to enable us to formulate a confident judgment.
The key to the solution of the constitutional problem presented in the
gold clause cases depends upon the frank recognition of the fact that the
power given ,to Congress to regulate the value of coined money means the
legislative authority to regulate the purchasing power of all money. If this
point is once perceived, the whole field of discussion is immensely simplified.
The power to regulate the value of money necessarily includes a power to
adjust the volume of money, whether coin or credit currency, so as to maintain stability of prices or stability of the economic relationships of the
people. If it be suggested that such an interpretation of the power to
regulate the value of the money would give Congress unlimited control over
the economic substance of the creditor class, and would authorize an effective form of legal confiscation of property, the answer is that so long
as this regulatory power is directed toward the stabilization of prices and
the restoration of normal price levels, its, exercise can never result in the
confiscation of the real economic substance of the creditor class, nor of any
other class. If then the regulatory power is defined in a constitutional sense,
in such terms as will express this limitation on its directional thrust upon
economic situations, nothing can result that a philosopher, as distinguished
from a literally-minded lawyer, would ever call confiscation. The power to
regulate the currency thus limited is, in legislation like that of June 5,
1933,28 simply directed toward a restoration of normal accounting units,
so adjusted as to maintain the true and typical economic balance as between
creditors and debtors, and as between different industries and different
sections of the country.
The existence of a middle ground is also indicated from a second and
essentially distinct point of view. All governmental power under our system
has been regarded as circuiascribed by certain fundamental principles of
justice and right, which are believed to be enshrined in particular clauses
of the Constitution, such as the due process and just compensation clauses
of the Fifth Amendment, the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the impairment of contract clause of Article
'Supra note

2.
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I, Section 10, and the equal privileges and immunities clause of Article IV,
Section 2. These provisions derive their vitality and meaning from a wide
juristic background, and the constitutional doctrines which have been related
to particular constitutional clauses might perhaps have been invoked in
any event by. the judiciary as principles of restraint upon the arbitrary
action of legislative and executive power, even if these particular clauses
had not been included in the constitutional text.0 But at any rate, these
principles are established as a matter of legal and constitutional right, and
are recognized as being enforceable by the judiciary within the proper scope
of their application.30
The view that certain fundamental principles of justice, which may be
regarded as embodied in the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, apply as restrictions on the legislative as well as the
executive activity of both the state and federal governments, and that these
restrictions are judicially enforceable, received a classical formulation in the
course of the opinion of Mr. Justice Matthews in the well-known case of
Hurtado v. California,3 in the following language:
"But it is not to be supposed that these
lute and despotic, and that the amendment
law is too vague and indefinite to operate
is not every act, legislative in form, that

legislative powers are absoprescribing due process of
as a practical restraint. It
is law. Law is something

more than mere will exerted as an act of power. .

.

.Arbitrary power,

enforcing its edicts to the injury of the persons and property of its
subjects, is not law, whether manifested as the decree of a personal
monarch, or of an impersonal multitude, and the limitations imposed
by our constitutional law upon the action of the governments, both
state and national, are essential to the preservation of public and private rights, notwithstanding the representative character of our political
institutions. The enforcement of these limitations by judicial process
is the device of self-governing communities to protect the rights of
individuals and minorities."3 2
What reason is there for supposing that these principles do not apply
in relation to the currency powers of Congress, as well as in relation to its
'Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. 1 (1857); Loan Association v.Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 22 L.
ed. 455 (U. S. 1875) ; People v.Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 4 Am. Rep. 400 (1870) ; Hays v.
Pacific Mail Steamship Company, 17 How. 596, 15 L. ed. 254 (U. S.1855).
'Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 15 L.
ed. 372 (U. S. 1855) ; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S.97, 24 L. ed. 616 (1877) ;
In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am.Rep. 636 (1885) ; Wynehamer v.People, 13 N. Y. 378

(1856) ; Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393, 15 L. ed. 691 (U. S.1857) ; Warren, The

New Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment (1926) 39 HARv. L. REv. 431; Brown,
Due Process of Law, Police Power and the Supreme Court (1927) 40 HARv. L. Rv.
943.
m110 U. S.516, 4 Sup. Ct. 111, 28 L. ed. 232 (1884).
"110 U. S.516, at 535, 536 (1884).
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powers to regulate commerce, 38 to establish uniform bankruptcy laws,34 to
prescribe rules of procedure in the federal courts,85 of to provide for the
governing of the District of Columbia?3 3 Why should the currency power,
in contrast to- other powers of Congress, present the aspect of an irresistible
or unlimited power, as to which no juristic controls or restraints can, be
authoritatively prescribed? The due process clause and the vast body of
principles suggested by that term have been held applicable to the tax
power, which is as imperative and vigorous a power as any possessed by
the federal government.37 What ground is there for supposing that the
wholesome restraints in question cannot similarly be applied in the field
of currency legislation?
No controlling reason suggests itself that would lead to the anomalous
conclusion that these restrictive principles comprised within the blanket
term "due process of law" cannot be brought into application with relation
to currency legislation, for such legislation, like other types of legislation,
may be regarded as upsetting the proper balance which must be judicially
maintained between governmental power and private interests. 3 In other
words, legislation under the heading of the currency powers of Congress
which too seriously antagonizes existing rights of contract and property,
without the justification derived from the direct relevance of the criticized
legislation to genuine currency needs, might well be ruled judicially to be
unreasonable or arbitrary, and hence condemned as being a mere act of
power, and not a law of genuine and binding application in accordance with
3 9
constitutional principles.
If it be argued that the judiciary could not undertake to review the question of the reasonableness of currency legislation because of the lack of
any criterion for distinguishing between what would be reasonable and
what would not be reasonable, we may again turn to the same controlling
consideration that aided us toward defining the limits of the true currency
'Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. ed. 436 (1908) ; Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Company, 295 U. S. 330, 58 Sup. Ct. 758, 79 L. ed. 1468 (1935);
Tagg Bros. v. Moorhead, 280 U. S. 420, 50 Sup. Ct. 220, 74 L. ed. 524 (1930).
'Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 55 Sup. Ct. 854, 79
L. ed. 1593 (1935) ; Kuelner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U. S. 445, 57 Sup. Ct. 298, 81 L.

ed. 340 (1937).
'Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 52 Sup. Ct. 285, 76 L. ed. 598 (1932) ; Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U. S: 589, 51 Sup. Ct. 608, 75 L. ed. 1289 (1931) ; Wright v. Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U. S. 440, 57 Sup. Ct. 556, 81 L. ed. 736 (1937).
"District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617, 57 Sup. Ct. 660, 81 L. ed. 843
(1937); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. ed. 785
(1923); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct. 966, 42 L. ed. 270 (1897).
'7Unterrmyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440, 48 Sup. Ct. 353, 72 L. ed. 645 (1928);

Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710, 71 L. ed. 1184 (1927) ; Hoeper v.
Tax Commission, 284 U. S. 206, 52 Sup. Ct. 120, 76 L. ed. 248 (1931).
'Brown, loc. cit. supra note 30. Cf. Collier, The Constitution and Constitutional
Tradition (1938) 6 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 259.
"Hurtado v. California, supra note 31.
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powers of Congress. Under the conditions that existed .in 1933 when this
legislation was adopted, the serviceability of the legislation, in purpose and
effect, to the objective of approximate reflation of prices, would furnish
an obvious and fairly definite test of the reasonableness of the legislation,
and hence of its conformity to the requirements of the due process clause.
Currency legislation that was conducive to price reflation or to the stabilization of existing prices would be reasonable, while currency legislation
designed to produce marked inflation of prices above the usual statistical
levels, could well be held unreasonable, as it would seem to be aimed not
to correct the functional deficiencies of the currency, but to alter the substantial economic status of debtors and creditors as an end in itself. The
mere relief of debtors as an end in itself is not a proper objective for
currency legislation. Nor would a statute of the character supposed be
sustainable as an exercise of the power of Congress to make uniform rules
on the subject of bankruptcies. 40 It would exceed the true sphere of federal
action, and its undiscriminating character and the unjustifiable harm done
thereby to the creditor class would stamp it as "unreasonable". 4 '
While the Constitution declares that Congress may not deprive any
person of property without due process of law, those words cannot be
understood to impose any rigid barrier to the normal exercise of great
governmental powers. 42 If this were so, we should have the unjustifiable
result that a somewhat incidental phrase in the Fifth Amendment would
have the effect of striking out important powers granted in the original
Constitution. No such radical effect was attached to the Fifth Amendment by those who framed and ratified it.43 The principle of the due
l5rocess clause is a tempering principle which makes necessary some mitigation of the harshness and rigor which might otherwise attach to extreme
exercises of governmental power. But the clause should not be interpreted
as meaning that there has been, so to speak, a sort of "geographical"
cession, whereby legislative territory handed over to Congress in the first
instance by the original adoption of the Constitution has been ceded back
to the states, or to the people, and that important substantive powers theretofore existing in the federal government have been lost.
It must also be noted that the currency clauses of the Constitution, when
confronted with the clauses protecting property from confiscation, present a
"'Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, supra note 34; Kueliner v. Irving Trust

Co., supra note 34.

"Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571, 54 Sup. Ct. 840 (1934).
'Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 57 Sup. Ct. 883, 18 L.

ed. 1279 (1937.);
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones-Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. ed.
893 (1937) ; Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 55 L. ed. 1.12
(1911).
OANNALS OF CONGRESS, Vol. 1, p. 440 ff.
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peculiar, if not unique, problem in constitutional construction. In relation
to most legal situations, property, and the value of property in terms of
money, may be taken as practically synonymous. If a man has been by
governmental action deprived of tangible property which originally belonged
to him, he may well be entitled to compensation in money at current valuations for such property. But it will not ordinarily be true, as a matter of
ultimate constitutional right, that the government will be obligated to make
specific restitution of the property taken. 44 He has not been deprived of
his "property" in a constitutional sense, if he gets the fair valuation of
that "property" in terms of money as compensation. 45 But in relation to
the powers of Congress over the currency, it cannot be assumed without
serious discussion that the conception of "property" protected by the Constitution in a contract or chose in action is simply the market value at
the time of the governmental action complained of, measured in any currency declared to be legal tender by governmental authority, irrespective of
the extent of the variation 'between such valuation and the valuation in
terms of the units of currency existing when the contract was made. 46 The
"property" to be constitutionally protected may be argued to be the comparative economic value of the rights of ownership in the piece of property
under discussion; that is, its value in comparison with the values of other
commodities and economic interests considered as average ratios throughout
a long period of time. 47 Or it is even possible to maintain that the "property" to be constitutionally protected is the same as the conception of the
"Omnia Commercial Company v. United States, 261 U. S. 502, 43 Sup. Ct. 437, 67

L. ed. 773 (1923) ; Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U. S. 9, 5 Sup. Ct. 441, 28 L. ed.
889 (1885) ; Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. ed 865 (1921).
"Of course there may be cases where the government attempts to take property not
for a public use, or attempts regulatory action adversely affecting values, which does not

fall within the true sphere of legislative power. Varner v. Martin, 21 W. Va. 5"34
(1883); Brown v. Gerald, 100 Me. 351, 61 Atl. 785 (1905). In such cases even the
prbffer of adequate monetary compensation would not render the legislative plan
constitutional. But if we assume at this stage of our discussion that the gold clause
legislation of 1933 is prima. facie action within a proper governmental sphere, the due
process requirement will be satisfied by payment of just compensation for damage to
private property incidentally inflicted. Cf. Eldridge v. Trezivant, 160 U. S. 452, 16 Sup.
Ct. 345, 40 L. ed. 490 (1896) ; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L.
ed. 205 (1887) ; Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623, 32 Sup. Ct. 697, 56 L. ed. 1229
(1912), in which it was held in relation to diverse exercises of governmental power
that no compensation whatever need be paid, in order to forestall constitutional objections to the incidental destruction of property values.
"Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229, 19 L. ed. 141 (U. S. 1868) ; Trebilcock v. Wilson,
12 Wall. 687, 20 L. ed. 460 (U. S. 1871); Feist v. Soci6t6 Intercommunale Belge

D'Alectricit6, [19341 A. C. 161; Broken Hill Proprietary Co. v. Latham, [19331 1 Ch.
Div. 373; Cases of Serbian and Brazilian Loans, P. C. I. J., Series A, Nos. 20, 21
(World Court 1929).
"1
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valuation of that property in terms of the authorized units of coined money
and under the conditions of currency and credit existing when the contract
was made. 48 In short, the definition of property values that are entitled to
constitutional protection in relation to the currency powers of the United
States presents a legal problem whose solution is exceedingly difficult because of the variability in the meaning of the central terms that are employed in stating the problem.
It is evident that to regulate the value of money-that is, to regulate the
purchasing power of money-means necessarily to change somewhat the
value of property in the sense that the money equivalent that may be demanded for the property will be somewhat different after the monetary
regulation was put in force, as compared with what it was before that
time. But this does not mean that anyone has been deprived of property
in the sense of the constitutional prohibition. Each owner has the same
economic substance that he had before, although it may be described for
purposes of accounting or exchange as having a different valuation or price
in terms of money current thereafter. This is obviously true as to tangible
property. It is also true as to intangible property, including choses in action,
at least where price changes are merely reflatioiary, although this is not so
obvious.
The owner of land which is condemned for governmental purposes cannot
complain that the valuation fixed for such a parcel, in relation to current
values of adjacent property, is lower than what would have been indicated
by the price levels and valuations that were current three or four years
before. It would be recognized in this field of eminent domain that valuation for purposes of governmental appropriation was the same as valuation
for purposes of private exchange, fixed as of the time of the appropriation,
and that both the condemnation price and the current private competitive
price would naturally and legally be affected by the state of the currency,
as determined by lawful action of Congress. No one would contend that if
a man had bought land at a high price in 1865, he would have been deprived of property without due process of law if his land had been taken
by the government at a much lower price after the restoration of specie
payments in 1879, so long as the condemnation value corresponded with
current land values in 1879. In the reverse case, a man who bought land
cheaply in 1914 would be entitled to a much higher price for the same
property, if condemned for governmental purposes when a higher valuation
level in terms of money had been reached, as it was in the years 1917
and 1918.
'This position is really the one taken by the dissenting justices in the leading gold
clause cases. Vide opinions of McReynolds, J., 294 U. S. 330, 361, 79 L. ed. 912,
923 (1935) ; and 58 Sup. Ct. 248, 257, 82 L. ed. 235, 244 (1937).
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In other words, it would readily be recognized that with regard to tangible
property the essence of property rights is the valuation in standard currency at the time, and not some fixed monetary amount, not a certain
number of units of value used for accounting purposes. 49 "Property" constitutionally protected in such cases would certainly be the economic substance of the tangible land or things to which the property rights related,
and this would be expressed by changing the monetary valuations to correspond with current market quotations in terms of the contemporary legal
currency. A man would not be deprived unconstitutionally of his tangible
property without due process of law as long as he received proper allowances for the appropriation thereof, or for injuries inflicted thereon through
governmental action, such compensation being fixed in terms of valuations
then current.
Is not this analogy very important in considering the nature of the essential rights of property that are constitutionallyprotected by the Fifth Amendment as against confiscatory governmental action in the field of choses in
action and intangible property rightsf
It is true that a chose in action for a fixed amount of money, apart from
the question of legislative modification, will remain fixed, independent of
variations in the general price level. That is, the law will enforce the claim
according to its monetary amount, and not according to the economic weight
and relative significance of this chose in action as compared with other
investments or interests in property at the time when the chose in action
was acquired.5 ° But in judging the position of such a chose in action with
reference to the constitutional power of Congress over the currency, the
essential rights of property in such chose that are to be constitutionally
protected, even as against legislative action, are the same as in the case
of tangible property. 5 ' The element in the chose in action that is constitutionally untouchable is the economic substance involved in' the property
right, and its relational position with reference to other property rights
and other economic interests. Legislation pursuant to an acknowledged
power of Congress, that not only leaves untouched the essential economic
substance of existing choses in action, but attempts to restore them to a
normal and proper valuation by means of currency adjustments, cannot
properly be regarded as confiscatory. Stabilization of valuations is not
"Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct. 966, 42 L. ed. 270 (1897); Sweet v.
Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 16 Sup. Ct. 43, 40 L. ed. 188 (1895) ; Otis Co. v. Ludlow Mfg.
Co., 201 U. S. 140, 26 Sup. Ct. 353, 50 L. ed. 696 (1906); Manigault v. Springs, 199
U. S. 473, 26 Sup. Ct. 127, 50 L. ed. 274 (1905).
'Bronson v. Rodes, mpra note 46; Trebilcock v. Wilson, supra note 46; Gregory v.
Morris, 96 U. S. 619 (1878).
'Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557, 19 L. ed. 501 (U. S. 1869) ; Eaton v. Boston, C. &

M. R. R., 51 N. H. 504, 12 Am. Rep. 147 (1872).
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confiscation of property. Valuations are the result of currency conditions,
and currency conditions may be regulated by Congress under its express
powers. We are again brought to the principle that so long as Congress
is endeavoring to stabilize prices over a period of years, or is endeavoring
to pkoduce an approximate reflation of depressed commodity and real estate
prices to levels normal for an average of years, it cannot be said that Congress is so perverting its function in regulating the value of money as to
come within the condemnation of any of the clauses in the Constitution
safe-guarding private rights.
The principle of the action of Congress in the gold clause legislation is
really the same as that expressed in the ancient maxim: Suum cuique
tribuere. That is, Congress is seeking to stabilize the existing economic
relationships and prevent the acquisition by certain classes of choses in
action of an abnormal economic weight arid significance.
The importance of establishing a more definite criterion with reference
to the restrictive effect of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
is forcibly illustrated by the opinion and reasoning of the majority of the
Court in the case of Perry v. United States,5 2 which related to the enforceability of the gold clause in the bonds of the United States. This
case, like the Nortz case, 53 which involved the effect of the gold clause in
a circulating gold certificate, was actually disposed of on the ground that
whatever might be the substantive merits of the claims of the holders of
these government obligations, there could be no adequate showing of concrete damage, such as would be requisite to sustain their suits in the Court
of Claims, in view of the fact that the prohibition upon the transportation,
marketing, and hoarding of gold was regarded as a valid currency regulation. On the assumption of the validity and. binding effect of the restrictions on the market for gold, these claimants could -have derived no actual
benefit or use from the gold which they claimed'the Treasury was obligated
to pay them. As soon as the gold coin could be paid over to the claimants,
the coin would be subject to sequestration, and the parties would be required to accept legal tender paper currency of a corresponding nominal
amount in lieu of their momentarily possessed gold pieces.
Whatever may be the merits of this reasoning, it seems to apply equally
in the Perry case, involving United States bond, and in the Nortz case,
involving the circulating gold certificates. Yet the Norta case was disposed
of on this ground exclusively, without any specific ruling as to the substantive validity of the action of Congress in denying enforceability to
the gold clause in the circulating gold certificates (among other obligations
'Supra
'Supra note
note 10.
12.
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of the United States). But in the Perry case, while relying on this same
argument as to the absence of damages for the purpose of controlling the
ultimate practical outcome of the case, the majority of the court nevertheless enunciated the doctrine that the gold clause in the bonds of the United
States was inviolable as a matter of substantive principle. Although the
bonds of private obligors had just been held subject to the paramount legislative power of Congress dealing with currency problems, even with reference to provisions displacing the gold clauses in such private contracts, yet
the government's own obligations were immediately treated as standing in
a different category. The government's borrowing power was held to be
complete in itself, and to involve the power to make binding agreements
which are unchangeable by the legislative power of Congress, acting pursuant to other branches of the federal legislative authority. The Court said:
"In authorizing Congress to borrow money, the Constitution empowers the Congress to fix the amount to be borrowed and the terms
of payment .... To say that the Congress may withdraw or ignore that

pledge is to assume that the Constitution contemplates a vain promise
and pledge having no other sanction than the pleasure and convenience
of the pledgor. This court has given no sanction to such a conception
of the obligations of our Government. . . When the United States
with constitutional authority makes contracts, it has rights and incurs
responsibilities similar to those of individuals who are parties to such
instruments. There is no difference . . .except that the United States
cannot be sued without its consent. . . . The powers conferred upon
the Congress are harmonious .... The binding quality of a promise of

the United States is of the essence of the credit which is so .pledged.
Having this power to authorize the issue of definite obligations for the
payment of money borrowed, the Congress has not been vested with
authority to after or destroy those obligations. The fact that the United
States may not be sued without its consent is a matter of procedure
which does not affect the legal and binding character of its contracts.
While the Congress is under no duty to provide remedies through the
courts, the contractual obligation still exists, and despite infirmities
of procedure, remains binding upon the conscience of the sovereign .'54
The reason why the Perry case was treated differently from the Nortz
case in this respect probably was that the Liberty Loan bonds dealt with
in the Perry case represented beyond doubt an exercise of the borrowing
power of the United States, and apparently were not to any extent the expression of the power of Congress to regulate the value of money. They
were regarded by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes as not presenting any currency
question, or any question that could properly be disposed of by subsequent
legislation by Congress under the guise of its currency powers.
On the other hand, the gold certificate dealt with in the Nortz case is
"Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330, at 351, 352, 353 (1935).
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representative of one of the principal kinds of. currency theretofore in circulation. The gold certificate is capable of being viewed as an object of intrinsic value, a functional unit forming part of the currency, like a coin.
It is not merely a promise to pay money, but is itself a kind of money, since
it is the legal equivalent of coin, and would, both before and after the gold
clause legislation, be recognized as representing the currency powers of
Congress, rather than the borrowing power of the United States.
Hence, in the Liberty Bond case, the argument works out neatly that the
bond is an expression of a separate power of Congress, and belongs to a
separate legal category, entirely distinct from the currency, and not within
the retroactive control of currency legislation by Congress. But in the gold
certificate case, this argument does not work out at all. It does not appear
to be true that the gold certificate is wholly or chiefly an expression of the
borrowing power of Congress, or that it belongs to a special category separate from the rest of the coinage and currency of the country. Hence, it
would appear that the gold certificates and the gold clause obligation recited
therein do fall within the reach of the currency powers of Congress, although
the Court does not expressly say so.
For this reason, the Nortz case is disposed of entirely on the expressed
ground that no damage is shown. No statement is made, in the opinion of
Mr. Chief justice Hughes in that case, to demonstrate that the gold clause
obligation in the gold certificate is inviolable as a matter of substantive
principle.
In view of the fact that both cases are actually disposed of on the ground
of lack of damage, it would seem that the statements in the Perry case as to
the inviolability of the Liberty Loan bonds as a matter of substantive principle are unnecessary to the actual decision, and could properly have been
eliminated. For this reason, Mr. Justice Stone, in his brief, but most
valuable concurring opinion in the Perry case,r5 questioned the propriety
of the rulings laid down in the opinion of the Chief Justice on the points of
substantive principle as to the unchangeability of the bonded obligations of
the United States. But in view of the fact that the dissenting minority of
four Justices would undoubtedly have agreed with the Chief Justice
rather than Mr. Justice Stone on this particular point, since the dissenters
were in favor of validating the gold clauses all along the line, it seems that
the views expressed by the Chief Justice as to the substantive inviolability
of the gold clauses in bonds of the United States must be accepted as setting
forth a doctrine of paramount importance entertained by a large majority of
the Supreme Court Justices, which may find concrete application in possible
future cases where the element of actual, or legal damage can in some way be
shown.
-'294 U. S. 330, 358, 55 Sup. Ct. 432, 79 L. ed. 921 (1935).
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Since the doctrine is an integral part of an unbroken argument, it cannot
be regarded as mere obiter dictum in the ordinary sense of that term, but
is an essential part of the analysis and settlement of the gold clause controversy, viewed in its entirety. The question immediately occurs to one: what
sound and sufficient basis is there for this doctrine of the substantive inviolability of gold clauses in bonds of the United States? The problem
presented, reduced to its lowest terms, is whether the United States, in the
exercise of one of its sovereign powers, namely, the borrowing power, can
create obligations and legal situations which are beyond the reach of another
of its sovereign powers, namely, the power to regulate the currency.
The obstructive effect of the gold clauses in private bonds upon the free
flow and normal functioning of the currency was supposed to have been
demonstrated by the Chief Justice in Norman v. United States, the first of
the series decided. As a mere matter of relationship, do not the gold clauses
in United States bonds have pro tanto a similar obstructive effect upon the
normal functioning of the currency as dd those in private bonds, and if so,
do they not come similarly within the control of the currency powers of
Congress?
At this point, it may be objected that Congress may not in a constitutional
sense deprive parties of their vested rights under contracts with the United
States. But the answer to this objection is that both in private bonds and
in public bonds the holders have no vested rights with respect to the
decisive point, namely, the complete immunity of the gold clauses in either
set of bonds from control by Congress, acting under its currency powers.
It is true that the borrowing power of the United States may be regarded
as distinct from its currency powers, but this argument hardly seems to show
more than that the borrowing power results in contracts to which the United
States is obligated in the same way as private parties are obligated by similar
contracts on their part. In the Sinking Fund cases,5" in a passage quoted by
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in the Perry case, the Court said:
"The United States are as much bound by their coritracts as are individuals. If they repudiate their obligations, it is as much repudiation,
with all the wrong and reproach that term implies, as it would
be if
' '57
the repudiator had been a state or a municipality or a citizen.
It may be. quite true that the United States are as much bound by their
contracts as are individuals, but under the prevailing doctrine in gold clause
cases, the United States are much more firmly bound by theift contracts than
individuals are. Individual obligations may be altered in effect through the
currency powers of Congress, but obligations of the United States, although
'99 U. S. 700, 25 L. ed. 496 (1878).
m99 U. S. 700, at 718 (1878).
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having a similar practical position in the financial markets of. the country,
may not be so altered.
From the standpoint of currency standards and the policy of maintaining
th6 functional efficiency of the currency, this ruling of the Supreme Court
tends to preserve in the large and important sphere of the obligations of
the government the very conditions of abnormal economic weighting of contracts that prompted the gold clause legislation in the first place. In other
words, from a currency point of view, the reasons for denying effect to
the gold clauses are the same in relation to contracts of the United States
that they are with relation to the contracts of private parties. 58 The exercise
of the currency powers of Congress has an equally legitimate bearing upon
both the private and the governmental obligations. The ruling of the Supreme Court tends to preserve to a large extent the double standard of
valuations which is condemned by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in the Norman
case.

59

The real basis of the opinion of the Chief Justice as to the inviolability of the United States bonds is a simple, ethical postulate that the
United States, like individuals, should conform to the literal tenor of its
promises. But it should at once be recognized that such an ethical postulate
cannot be regarded as the equivalent of a direct constitutional guarantee,
enforceable in the judicial courts. The choice as to the moral issue rests with
the political branches of the government, and not with the courts. For the
judiciary to deny effect to legislation of Congress, there must be a plain
legal reason, founded on express or implied constitutional guarantees. The
mere grandeur of an assumed moral principle will not suffice.
When the attempt is made to find a definite legal guarantee in the language or the implications of the Constitution, it at once becomes apparent
that there is a fundamental and genuine conflict between the ruling as to
the substantive inviolability of the bonds of the United States and the
ruling that there is no recoverable damage.
How can it be that a party is deprived of property without due process
of law when he has not been so damaged by the deprivation as to enable
him to maintain an action for compensation in a case where it is assumed
that no procedural immunity has been conferred upon the party defendant
-the United States ?60 How can it be said that private property has been
'Stone, J., concurring in Smyth v. United States, 58 Sup. Ct. 248, 255, 82 L. ed. 235,
242 (1937).
'"Itrequires no acute analysis or profound economic inquiry to disclose'the dislocation
of the domestic economy that would be caused by such a disparity of conditions, in which
it is insisted these debtors under gold clauses should be required to pay $1.69 in currency,
while respectively receiving their taxes, rates, charges, and price on the basis of $1.00
of that currency." Per Hughes, C. J., 294 U. S. 240, 315, 55 Sup. Ct. 407, 419, 79 L. ed.
885, 906 (1935).
'United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company, 229 U. S. 53, 33 Sup.
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taken for public use without just compensation when it is found in a judicial
investigation that no compensation is due? In other words, is it not true
that the due process and just compensation clauses of the Constitution
merely protect the inner substance and genuine economic value of interests
which the law undertakes to secure under the form of property rights,
and that these clauses and other like clauses in the Constitution do not, as
a matter of ultimate constitutional principle, protect the form or externals
of property rights from change by proper legislative authority? If it is
admitted that the currency power extends to the prohibition on the use of
gold at a time when gold has an abnormally high market valuation (as is
held both in the Perry and Nortz cases), is it not clear that the constitutionally protected substance of property rights in contracts of this nature
has not been taken away by such legislation; that the parties have not been
deprived of their "property" without due process?s' And if they'have not
been deprived of property in a practical sense-for this is the reason that
they cannot recover any compensation for the alleged loss-how can it be
correct to say that they have been deprived of property in an abstract constitutional sense in violation of fundamental constitutional guarantees?
There is yet another and broader objection to the reasoning of Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes on this point, namely, that he assumes that the constitutionally protected property right involved in the claims of holders of bonds of
the United States is the same as the original form of their contracts,
viewed in the light of rights of enforcement that existed at the time the
contracts were made. Constitutionally protected property rights are regarded
by him as coterminous with property rights existing at common law or
under earlier statutes. But this implies an excessive rigidity in the constitutional protection of property rights that would be inconsistent with any
real freedom for the legislative power. If the courts undertake to protect
property from the effects of legislative action, this cannot be a rigid and
complete protection, so that the property rights remain forever unchanged
and rigidly resistant.6 2 Then too, the constitutional protection should not
lay particular stress on the form and the contractual language in which
obligations are dressed.6 If the stress is thrown on the idea that property
Ct. 667, 57 L. ed. 1063 (1913) ; Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 26 Sup. Ct. 127,
50 L. ed. 274 (1905) ; Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U. S. 536, 27 Sup. Ct. 686, 51
L. ed. 1176 (1906); Bohm v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry. Co., 129 N. Y. 576, 29 N. E.
802, 14 L. R. A. 344 (1892).
'Hanna, Currency Control and Private Property, supra note 18.
'Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct.
231, 78 L. ed. 413 (1934) ; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47
Sup. Ct. 114, 71 L. ed. 303 (1926) ; Ohio Oil Company v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190, 20 Sup.
Ct. 576, 44 L. ed. 729 (1900).
'Wright v. Mountain Trust Bank, supra note 34; Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, supra note 64; W. B. Worthen Company v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56,
55 Sup. Ct. 555, 79 L. Ed. 1298 (1935) ; West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379,
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rights are relative and that property holders, including bondholders, have
only the right that the substantial economic weight of their claims shall
be preserved with proportionate security under economic conditions where
valuations are rapidly changing, it is plain that this analysis applies equally
well to both public and private bonds. It is true in both cases that the
constitutionally protected rights of bondholders are relational and proportionate, not absolute and unchanging.
To use a mathematical term, the property rights of both public and private bondholders and note holders should be treated as fuWnctions of other
property rights for the purpose of constitutional protection and classification.
If the property rights represented in choses in action for fixed sums of money
or for fixed amounts of specified gold 'coins are allowed to retain the same
relative economic weight and significance in a changing economic order, they
have reccived all the protection as against legislative policy and taxation that
the courts are justified in giving them on the basis of the vague' suggestions
of the due process and just compensation clauses of the Fifth Amendment.
These clauses can never properly be regarded as definite, declaratory mandates, setting forth the explicit duty of the judiciary with unmistakable
precision,64 but only as guiding stars to lead them along lines of moderate
and tolerant corrective action in relation to the legislative choices of Congress.
If now we return to the Holyoke Water Power case,65 after our long
excursion through the crucial earlier cases, it seems clear that the principles
accepted and acted on by the majority of the Supreme Court in those earlier
cases made necessary the result actually reached by the majority of the
Court in this case, namely, that the obligation of the lessee should be dischargeable by payment in lawful currency of the United States, of whatever
type, in the same amount as that specified in terms of gold in the language
of the leases, to wit: $1,500 annually. The terms of the leases obviously
call for payments; that is, for the bse of the currency-the circulating
medium. 66 This circulating medium must be the one authorized by Congress.
57 Sup. Ct. 578, 81 L. ed. 703 (1937) ; Mountain Timber Company v. Washington, 243
U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260, 61 L. ed. 685 (1917).
"Steward Machine Company v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 57 Sup. Ct. 883, 81 L. ed.
1279 (1937) ; Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 57 Sup. Ct.
868, 81 L. ed. 1245 (1937); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, supra note 41; Block v.
Hirsch, supra note 43; Holmes, J., dissenting in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45,
75, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. ed. 937, 949 (1905).
O'Supra note 3.
'The parties in the Holyoke Water Power case were obviously not stipulating for the
transfer of gold as a commodity. This is shown by two important pieces of evidence.
First, neither of the parties was in the business of handling gold as a commodity, nor
was there any purpose disclosed to use the gold referred to in the contract as a metal
or as a commodity desired for its intrinsic usefulness. The purpose was not to get
gold as such, but to get the payment in terms that were thought to have special stability. The proposed transfer was, therefore, as a currency matter, and comes within the
scope of the regulatory power of Congress over the currency.
The second piece of evidence is that the lease provided that the lessee might pay the
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Congress, in the exercise of its currency powers, has prohibited the literal
enforcement of the contracts which purport to give the obligee the right
to require payment in gold, or a particular kind of coin. or currency. The
dominant purpose and characteristic effect of this enactment of Congress
is not to affect the substance or relative economic value of the chose in
action held by the creditor, who has stipulated for payment in gold, as if
an alteration of the debtor-creditor relation was a desirable end in itself.
But the controlling purpose and the paramount effect of the statute is to
promote the functional efficiency of the authorized currency of the United
States, regarded as an entire body or single agency devoted to the function
of satisfying the needs of the American people for a medium of exchange.
It is true that the .contract under consideration in the Holyoke Water
Power case evidently contemplates that gold may have a superior value in
terms of other types of authorized currency of the United States, and that
its market exchange value may be greater than the nominal accounting value
attributed to gold coins under the currency laws of the United States. But
this possibility is exactly the possibility which Congress is entitled to attempt
to forestall by regulatory measures. For if gold coins may acquire a disproportionate value in relation to other units of the currency, we shall
no longer have a uniform or reliable currency by which the valuation of
other commodities and securities may be accurately measured and determined. We shall have a multi-colored circulating medium which is itself
the object of speculation and of unbearable economic pressures, so that it
can no longer function as an adequate medium for the measurement of external values. A currency which is undergoing violent internal conflict, and
whose components are at war with one another, cannot function properly
as a sound and stable circulating medium. Congress, in its power to insure
the safety of the currency, had the authority to take all necessary and
proper measures to prevent such a derangement of the true currency function.
The decision in Smyth v. United States,6 7 the latest in date of the series
of "gold clause" cases, would have been very much easier to sustain if the
error in Perry v. United States68 had been avoided. It becomes more and
more clear, as authoritative decisions on this subject are gradually worked
out, that the true doctrine on the entire matter is that laid down in the conequivalent of the gold "in United States currency." It is a familiar principle of the law
of contracts that where methods of performance are stated in the alternative, the debtor.
or obligor, has the option as to which method to pursue. The only method of performance
that would be legally enforceable would therefore be the alternative of payment in United
States currency of the equivalent of the quantity of gold stipulated for. In short, the ultimate fact is that the contract calls for a payment in terms of the United States currency.
The transaction is, therefore, a currency transaction.
'Supra note 5.
'8Supra note 10.
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curring opinions of- Mr. Justice Stone. In both the Perry case and the
Smyth case, the majority opinion of the Court lays down a principle or
theory as to the inviolability of the gold promises in United States bonds
which it is unwilling or unable to carry out in practice. In order to avoid
enforcing the obligation to which it has accorded theoretical invulnerability,
the majority of the Court resorts to somewhat technical and artificial
methods of reasoning to show either that no damage to United States bondholders has been proved, as in the Perry case, or that the notice of redemption debars any effective claim for actual gold payments, as in the Smyth
case. The belief is thus encouraged that somehow, in some other state of
facts, a holder of United States bonds which contain the gold clause may
be able to sue thereon and recover the full equivalent of the special gold
value.
But a realistic view of the matter indicates that this belief will prove
illusory. The majority of the Supreme Court has shown a constant unwillingness to permit an actual recovery of the market valuation of the gold
promises in the United States bonds or in the interest coupons attached
thereto. True, the court has the power "to raise a standard to which the
wise and honest may repair," even though it cannot in practical effect
enforce loyal adherence to this standard. But the Court's hesitancy in the
present instance has an intellectual as well as a practical background. As
is consistently maintained in the concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Stone,6 9
the merits of the constitutional argument as to the impregnability of the
gold clause in United States bonds are essentially the same as they are with
respect to the effect of that clause in private bonds. The controlling question
in both fields of litigation is whether the legislation under debate is a
frontal attack on the debtor-creditor relationship, an effort to forfeit the
values held by the creditor class as an end in itself, or whether the effect
on the economic weight and significance of debts is genuinely incidental to
a legitimate currency policy. If Congress has really been legislating to
regulate the value of money, in order that the currency of the nation may
properly fulfill its essential functions, its legislation cannot be invalidated
because of its secondary effects, whether these effects be found in the
field of the economic weight of private obligations, or in the field of the
economic weight of the obligations of the United States itself.
OSupra note 55; supra note 58.

